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CONSTITUTION AS LITERATURE

CONSTITUTION AS LITERATURE
Although presumably no one would say that the Constitution offers its readers an experience that cannot be distinguished from reading a poem or a novel, there is
nonetheless a sense in which it is a kind of highly imaginative literature in its own right (indeed its nature as law
requires that this be so), the reading of which may be
informed by our experience of other literary forms. But to
say this may be controversial, and the first step toward
understanding how such a claim can be made may be to
ask what it is we think characterizes imaginative literature
in the first place.
It is common in our culture to marginalize ‘‘high literature,’’ even while admiring it, and this mainly by thinking
of it as offering nothing more than a refined pleasure,
merely aesthetic in kind, and by assuming that it can
therefore have nothing to do with practical affairs, with
money or power. Those who think of themselves as literary
people sometimes reciprocate with a marginalization of
their own, speaking as if the merely practical offered nothing of interest to one who is devoted to what Wallace Stevens once called ‘‘the finer things of life.’’ But this mutual
marginalization impoverishes both sides, and the rest of
us too, for it rests on a false dichotomy, between the aesthetic and the practical, which is like—and related to—
those between fact and fiction, form and content, science
and art.
For there is an important sense in which all literature
is constitutive, great literature greatly so, of the resources
of culture, which are simultaneously employed and remade in the creation of the text, and of what might be
called the textual community as well. (By this I mean the
relations that each text establishes between its author and
its reader, and between those two and the others that it
talks about.)
Beginning with the second point, we can say that every
text, whether self-consciously literary or not, establishes

what Aristotle called an ethos (or character) for its speaker
and its reader and for those it speaks about as well; in
addition, it establishes, or tries to establish, a relation
among these various actors. In this sense every text is socially and ethically constitutive, a species of ethical and
political action, and can be understood and judged as such.
In fact, we make judgments of this sort all the time—
although perhaps crudely so—for example whenever we
find a politician’s speech patronizing or a commercial advertisement manipulative or when we welcome frank correction at the hand of a friend.
The first point, that the text reconstitutes its culture, is
perhaps more familiar, for we have long seen works of art
as remaking the culture out of which they are made. This
observation establishes a significant connection between
the Constitution (and other legal texts) on the one hand
and literary texts on the other; for in both, the material of
the past is reworked in the present, and part of the art of
each of these kinds of literature is the transformation, or
reconstitution, of its resources.
To say this is to leave open, of course, the question how,
and by what standards, such judgments of art and ethics
are to be made. To pursue this question would be the work
of a volume at least; let it suffice here to say these are
judgments that expression of all sorts permits and that expression of a self-conscious kind—in the law and in fiction, as well as poetry and history—invites. Perhaps we
can say in addition that through the reading of texts that
address this question in interesting and important ways
we may hope to develop our own capacities of analysis and
judgment. For present purposes, the point is simply to
suggest that once literature is seen as socially and culturally constitutive, the connection with the Constitution,
and with the judicial literature elaborating it, may seem
less strange than it otherwise might.
This line of thought began by rethinking what we mean
by literature. We might wish to start from the other side,
by thinking again about our ways of imagining law. In our
culture the law is all too often seen simply as a set of rules
or directives issuing from a sovereign to be obeyed or disobeyed by those subject to it. This is the understanding—
crudely positivistic—that for many years dominated much
of our theoretical thinking and much of our teaching as
well; it still holds sway deeper in our minds than we may
like to admit. In fact, as the history of the Constitution
itself demonstrates with exemplary clarity, the meaning of
legal directives is not self-evident or self-established, but
requires the participation of readers who offer a variety of
interpretations, often in competition with each other. In
this sense the readers, as well as the writers, of our central
legal texts are makers of the law, and any view of the law
and the Constitution should reflect this fact.
Law is perhaps best thought of, then, not as a structure

CONSTITUTION AS LITERATURE
of rules, but as a set of activities and practices through
which people engage both with their language (and with
the rest of their cultural inheritance) and with each other.
One of its aims, deeply literary in character, is to give
meaning to experience in language; this is the backwardlooking role of law. When it looks forward, as it does above
all in the Constitution (but also in contracts, statutes, loan
agreements, and trust indentures), it seeks to establish
through language a set of relations among various actors,
each of whom is given by the legal text certain tasks, obligations, or opportunities that otherwise would not exist,
but none of which can be perfectly defined in language.
By its nature, then, the legal text gives rise to a set of
rhetorical and literary activities through which alone it can
work.
The point of such a line of thought is not to assert there
is no difference between a judicial opinion, or a constitutional amendment, and a lyric poem—that would be
silly—but that, by looking to the deeper structures of the
activities in which we engage, we may see them as sharing
certain concerns and do this in ways that improve our capacity to understand, to judge, and to perform them. We
may perhaps free literature from the veil drawn over it by
the claim that it is merely aesthetic and, at the same time,
free law from its veil, made of the claims that it is purely
practical, only about power, or simply a branch of one of
the policy sciences.
The Constitution is constitutive in the two ways in
which every text is: it recasts the material of its tradition
into new forms, for good or ill; and it establishes a set of
relations among the actors it addresses and defines. The
first point is historical and quite familiar and usually takes
the form of observing that the U.S. Constitution is not a
wholly radical innovation, but built upon certain models—
British and colonial—out of which it grew. To this fact
indeed it owes much of its durability and, perhaps as well,
much of its capacity to make what really was new (that is,
dual sovereignty) both intelligible and real. The second
point is really a suggested way of reading the Constitution:
not as a document allocating something called ‘‘power’’
but as a rhetorical creation defining new places and occasions for talk, creating new speakers, and establishing
conditions of guidance and restraint. All of these activities
are imperfectly determinate and therefore call for the literary and rhetorical practices of reading and writing, intepretation and argument, that lie at the center of the law.
Before the Constitution was adopted, none of its official
actors existed; there was no President, no Senate, no Supreme Court. One of the effects of the text, as ratified,
was to bring these actors into existence. But that is not the
end of it; every act of these new actors depends for its
validity upon a claim, implied or expressed, about the
meaning of the Constitution itself, and every such claim
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is in principle open to argument. This is not to say that
the Constitution is incoherent, but that as a work of language it has much uncertainty built into it. In fact, it has
the only kind of coherence that is open for human institutions to have.
This brings us to the most obvious, and best rehearsed,
connection between literature and the law, especially constitutional law, namely, both of these fields work by the
reading of texts, or by what it is now the fashion to call
‘‘interpretation.’’ That word, however, is not without its
dangers, for it may be taken to imply that an interpreter
of a text reproduces in her own prose, in her ‘‘interpretation,’’ a statement of what the original text means that is
in some sense complete and exhaustive, which can indeed
serve as an adequate substitute for it. But in neither literature nor the law can this be done; any ‘‘interpretation’’
is of necessity partial, in the sense that it is both incomplete and motivated by a set of understandings and desires
that belong to the present reader (formed though these
are in part from the materials of the past). The ‘‘interpretation’’ of an earlier text does not so much restate its meaning as elaborate possibilities of meaning that it has left
open; the new text is the product of a new time, as well
as the old.
Not solely the product of the present and of its partialities, both law and literature are grounded on the premise that the past speaks to us in texts that illumine and
constrain though always incompletely so. Accordingly,
there are similar interpretive vices in both fields; for example, the attempt to collapse the text, with all its difficulties and uncertainties, into some simplified statement
of its ‘‘plain meaning,’’ all too often in denial of the uncertainties that both kinds of texts necessarily have and
with them the responsibilities for judgment that they generate. Or we may seek simplicity in another direction, defining the meaning of the text by reference to something
outside it (for example, the biography of the writer or the
‘‘original intention’’ of the framer or legislator), usually
without recognizing that what we think of ourselves as
simply referring to is also, in part at least, our own creation—a text which itself requires interpretation. The result of both of these methods is the hidden arrogation of
power to the so-called interpreters, who pretend to yield
to an external authority, but actually exercise the power in
question themselves. Or the vice may be of an opposite
kind: to see so much complexity and indeterminacy in a
text as to make its responsible reading hopeless and to say,
therefore, that nothing can be clear but our own desires
(if those) and that no respect needs to be paid (because
none can) to the putatively authoritative texts of others.
At its extreme, the tendency of this method is to destroy
both law and culture.
In both kinds of work the process of reading requires
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a toleration of ambiguity and uncertainty: a recognition of
complexity, an acknowledgment that our own habits of
mind condition both what we see in a text and what we
feel about it, and a relinquishment of the hope of universal
and absolute clarity. Yet it requires a recognition as well
that the past can speak to the present, that culture can be
transmitted and transformed, that it is possible, and worth
doing, to look beyond ourselves to that which we have
inherited from others. Here, in this uncertain struggle to
discover and state meaning, to establish a connection with
the texts of another, is the life of law and literature alike.
One feature of legal interpretation that is distinctive,
or distinctively clear, and of special relevance to the Constitution is its idealizing character. The reading of legal
texts inherently involves us in the expression of our ideals,
and this in two ways. First, whenever we interpret the
Constitution, or any other legal text, we necessarily imagine for it an author, with a certain imagined character and
set of values, situated in a certain set of circumstances,
and actuated by a certain set of motives or aims. For whatever our theory may pretend, the text cannot be read simply as an abstract order or as the decontextualized
statement of an idea; it must be read as the work of a mind
speaking to minds. Thus, in our every act of interpretation
we define—indeed, we create—a mind behind the text.
This is necessarily the expression of an ideal; although, of
course, our sense of the past helps to shape it, and to call
it an ideal is not to say that it is one that all people share.
But we idealize the speakers of the law, or it is not law.
Second, the literature of the law is inherently idealizing
in the way in which lawyers idealize their official audiences. We speak to a judge not as to the small-minded
angry person we actually think him to be, but as his own
version of the wisest and best judge in the world, as we
imagine it. And the judge too speaks not to a world of
greedy, selfish, and lazy people, as he may see us, but to
an ideal audience, the best version of the public he can
imagine. In both cases our acts of imagining are acts of
idealization for which we are responsible; it is in this way
the nature of law to make the ideal real.
JAMES BOYD WHITE
(1992)
(SEE ALSO: Constitutional Interpretation)
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